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DODD-FRANK AND BASEL III’S SKIN IN THE 
GAME DIVERGENCE AND WHY IT IS GOOD FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM 
ERIC THOMPSON† 
ABSTRACT 
The recent financial collapse has illuminated many problems with the global 
financial system.  One of these problems was that the financial system developed in a 
way that allowed banks to profit by simply making more loans instead of quality 
loans.  After the financial collapse, regulators scrambled to enact new legislation to 
better manage the financial system and avoid the problems that caused the collapse.  
One way in which regulators attempted to improve the system was to remove the 
ability of banks to generate limitless loans in which the banks had no stake.  Two 
such pieces of regulation, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act and the new provisions in the Basel Accords (Basel III), attempted to 
limit the ability of banks to make endless loans.  Although the Dodd-Frank Act’s risk 
retention requirement does a better job in this respect, having diverging systems of 
international regulation may prove to be beneficial. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Originate to Distribute (OTD) system of banking changes the incentives of 
the banking system from that of traditional banking.  By originating the mortgages 
and selling the income streams from them, banks generate large amounts of revenue 
from the fees associated with the transactions.1  Although there are caveats, this 
basic structure allows banks to divorce their success from that of the mortgages 
themselves.2  Securitization itself has many benefits, but one downside in the OTD 
model is that it gives banks incentives to generate as many mortgages as possible, 
sell them and repeat, a process that will hereinafter be referred to as “churning”.3  
Churning led to banks producing many bad loans such as subprime loans, NINJA 
loans, and liar loans, and when these bad loans defaulted in and around 2007, the 
financial industry collapsed.4  A lot of the new regulation targets capital and reserve 
requirements.  However, capital and reserve requirements do not greatly inhibit a 
bank’s ability to churn because a bank can sell its mortgage payment streams and 
return capital to its balance sheets, meeting regulatory requirements.   
In response to the recent financial collapse, two prominent pieces of regulation 
have been passed: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act5 (Dodd-Frank Act) and the 2010 revisions to the Basel Accords6 (Basel III).  
Both of these pieces of legislation attempt to address the new financial challenges in 
different ways.  In response to the OTD model, the Dodd-Frank Act requires firms 
that securitize to retain a portion of the risk of the mortgages.7  This requirement is 
commonly referred to as “skin in the game” because it forces banks to retain an 
                                                          
 1 See Antje Berndt & Anurag Gupta, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in the 
Originate to Distribute Model of Bank Credit 2 (Working Paper, Nov. 2008), available at 
http://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1290312. 
 2 See Benjamin J. Keys, Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, Financial 
Regulation and Securitization: Evidence from Subprime Loans 1 (Working Paper, Feb. 2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1346131. 
 3 See id. at 3. 
 4 See id. at 1. 
 5 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq. 
(2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 6 Compilation of Documents That Form the Global Regulatory Framework for Capital 
and Liquidity, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/list/basel3/index.htm (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter BIS Documents]. 
 7 See Dodd-Frank, supra note 5, § 941, Sec. 15G(c)(1)(B)(i).  
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interest in the mortgages.8  This forces banks to retain some of the risk of the loans 
defaulting, aligning the interest of the originators and investors.9  Basel III has no 
such provision and instead attempts to control the OTD model through capital 
requirements and other techniques.10  The Dodd-Frank Act’s skin in the game 
provision appears to do a better job of solving the problems created by churning by 
aligning originator and investor interests while leaving the actual investment 
decisions to the market.  However, a growing body of literature suggests that by 
having different regulatory systems, financial innovators cannot game the systems as 
easily, and risk and downturns will be less systemic.11  Additionally, by having 
separate systems, regulators can attempt different strategies to see which allow for 
the greatest growth while still maintaining trust and solvency in the market.12 
II.  THE ORIGINATE TO DISTRIBUTE MODEL13 
Securitization is a complex process that can have many variations.  Although the 
description below does not hold for all securitization transactions, the basic structure 
of the deal will be relatively similar.   
The process begins with banks making loans to borrowers.14  The loans are 
purchased by intermediaries that design and create the securitization (this step will 
be the focus of this paper, and as such, it is discussed in more detail below).15  
Originators pool the loans which are then transferred to an entity called a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV).16  Ideally, the transfer will be a true sale in which the 
originating bank no longer holds a stake in the receivables;  this step is necessary to 
protect investors in the SPV should the originator go bankrupt.17  Collateral and 
other credit enhancement techniques are usually used to help prevent the risk of 
default for the receivables.18  The SPV segments its receivables into tranches which 
                                                          
 8 See Howell E Jackson, Loan-Level Disclosure in Securitization Transactions: A 
Problem with Three Dimensions 3 (Harv. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 10-40 (2010), available 
at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/moving_forward_symposium/conference_drafts/3-2_jackson. 
pdf.  
 9 See id. 
 10 See generally BIS Documents, supra note 6.  
 11 See Roberta Romano, Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Comment 2 
(Yale Program for Stud. in Law, Econ. & Pub. Pol’y Research Paper No. 414, 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1697348. 
 12 See id. at 16–17. 
 13 For a model of a basic originate to distribute model, see Appendix A. 
 14 See TAMAR FRANKEL, 1 SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET 
POOLS, AND ASSET BACKED SECURITIES §2.1 (2nd ed. 2005) [hereinafter FRANKEL, 
SECURITIZATION].  
 15 See id. §§ 3.3-3.4.   
 16 See id. § 2.1. 
 17 See TAMAR FRANKEL & MARK FAGAN, LAW AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM ‒  
SECURITIZATION AND ASSET BACKED SECURITIES: LAW, PROCESS, CASE STUDIES, AND 
SIMULATIONS 232 (2009) [hereinafter FRANKEL & FAGAN, LAW AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM]. 
 18 See FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION, supra note 14, § 2.1. 
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have different levels of risk and payout.19  The SPV then issues the securities and 
market intermediaries sell them.20  For a diagram of a basic securitization 
transaction, see Appendix A. 
As noted earlier, the part of the securitization transaction where the loans are 
purchased from the by bank intermediaries in exchange for capital is an important 
part of the transaction.21  When it receives the liquid capital, the bank will record the 
transaction as a gain or a loss.22  In addition to the capital they receive, the banks 
receive a fee for the transaction.23  Because banks now have liquid capital on their 
books, they are able to use these assets to make more loans.24  This process can be 
repeated over and over again and the capital is simply churned through the bank 
while the bank makes its profits from the fees.25  For a diagram of the process of 
churning, see Appendix B. 
III.  BENEFITS AND HARM FROM SECURITIZATION 
A.  Benefits 
Securitization is a complex financial transaction, and although it has received a 
lot of bad press lately, investors, borrowers, and originators can still realize many 
benefits from its use.  Securitization provides originators access to cheaper capital 
than debt or equity markets.26  Securitization allows lenders to make more loans than 
they otherwise would.27  This allows the banks to earn more money28 and provides 
access to loans for those who otherwise would not have access.29  Securitization also 
gives more investors access to the mortgage market.  Normally, small investors 
would not be able to vet individual mortgages, nor would they be able to meet 
                                                          
 19 See id. 
 20 See id. 
 21 See id. §§ 3.3-3.4. 
 22 See Patricia M. Dechow, Linda A. Myers, & Catherine Shakespeare, Fair Value 
Accounting and Gains from Asset Securitizations: A Convenient Earnings Management Tool 
with Compensation Side-Benefits 2 (Working Paper, Feb. 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1111594.  
 23 See FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION, supra note 14, §§ 3.3-3.4. 
 24 See id. 
 25 See id. 
 26 See Stephen Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, LEVERHULME LECTURES, 
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, 4 (Nov. 11, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1707053 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Future of Securitization]. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION, supra note 14, §§ 3.3-3.4. 
 29 See FRANKEL & FAGAN, LAW AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 17, at 24 
(referencing Ivo Kolev, Financial Policy Forum ‒  Derivatives  Study  Center, Primer: 
Mortgage-Backed Securities, FINANCIALPOLICY.ORG (July 29, 2004), available at 
http://www.financialpolicy.org/fpfprimermbs.htm). 
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individual clients without becoming a specialist.30  Securitization removes these 
barriers by creating easily tradable securities.31  Finally, securitization gives 
borrowers access to cheaper capital as the reduced transaction costs are passed on to 
the borrower.32 
B.  Harms 
With the aforementioned benefits, securitization has shown its ability to incur 
substantial harm.  Securitization contributed largely to the subprime mortgage crisis 
which propelled the recent financial collapse.33  The process of securitization caused 
the moral hazard whereby banks had an incentive to generate as many mortgages as 
possible, and, therefore, generated many low-quality mortgages on which the 
borrowers later defaulted.34  Because the mortgage lenders did not have to live with 
the credit consequences of their loans and the lenders were able to churn loans, their 
standards fell.35  Because securitization is such a complex process with many parties, 
and many underlying assets, investors heavily, if not overly, relied on rating agencies 
to assess the risk of the securities.36  Unfortunately, the rating agencies did not 
succeed in accurately assessing the risk of many of these loans, and the unknowing 
investors incurred large losses.37  There were also problems with servicing the loans 
when the loans were securitized because the servicers typically did not have power 
to renegotiate the loans, but it would have been in everyone’s interest for the loans to 
be renegotiated. 
When a bank holds loans, if a problem arises, the bank can simply renegotiate 
with the borrower and come to a compromise to optimize the income.38  With 
securitization, servicers generally are supposed to have limited duties, and are not in 
a position to renegotiate.39  Among the many reasons why the servicers are only 
given limited duties, one is that the securitization is based off of the original terms of 
the loans, and changing the cash flow and value of the loan changes the value of the 
securitization.  The original bank may have the ability to renegotiate, but has no 
stake in the loan anymore.40  The original bank may be unable or unwilling to 
conduct a negotiation.41  The end investor in the SPV’s securities has no ability to 
                                                          
 30 See FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION, supra note 14, § 1.3. 
 31 See id. 
 32 See id. § 5.3. 
 33 See Schwarcz, Future of Securitization, supra note 26, at 2. 
 34 See id. 
 35 See id. at 7. 
 36 See id. at 5. 
 37 See id. 
 38 See id. at 9. 
 39 See id. at 10. 
 40 See id. at 9. 
 41 See id. 
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renegotiate individual loans, and is unlikely to have the resources to do so anyway.42  
Although it might be beneficial for all parties with a vested interest for the terms of a 
loan to be renegotiated, there is no reasonable way in which to do so.43 
IV.  HOW THE OTD MODEL ALLOWS BANKS TO MEET CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
Many commentators have stated that the OTD model of banking makes firms 
more risky by making them more leveraged.  Professor Margaret Blair claims that 
banks “could invest in mortgage-backed securities . . . on a more highly leveraged 
basis than they could when investing directly in mortgages.”44  Dr. Marianne Ojo 
states that “[i]n response to the recent Financial Crisis and to the realization that 
capital levels (which banks operated with) during the period of the Crisis were 
insufficient and also lacking in quality.”45  Hervé Hannoun, Deputy General 
Manager of the Bank for International Settlements, similarly claims that “[a]s a 
result, banks had to raise capital and deleverage their trading books in the midst of 
the crisis.”46  However, this understanding fails to comprehend what occurs in the 
OTD method of lending.  Although banks may have been overleveraged in the time 
leading to the financial crisis, it was not a result of the OTD model.  The OTD model 
allowed banks to easily increase their capital by selling the interest in the receivables 
for cash or some other liquid capital.47  If anything, the OTD model allows banks to 
be less leveraged and circumvent capital requirements by churning.48  By raising 
capital requirements, as many regulators have proposed, banks may have an 
incentive to churn a greater amount of loans because they will be even further 
restricted from making profits using traditional banking methods.  For a graphical 
representation of how the OTD model allows firms to use securitization to increase 
their capital, see Appendix B.   
                                                          
 42 See id. 
 43 See id. 
 44 Margaret Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles, and the Distribution of 
Income, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 242 (2010). 
 45 Marianne Ojo, Basel III and Responding to the Recent Financial Crisis: Progress Made 
by the Basel Committee in Relation to the Need for Increased Bank Capital and Increased 
Quality of Loss Absorbing Capital, 2 (Sept. 22, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680886. 
 46 Hervé Hannoun, Deputy GM, Bank for Int’l Settlements, 45th SEACEN Governors’ 
Conference: Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework 10 (Feb. 26-27, 2010), 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf. 
 47 See Gianfranco A. Vento & Pasquale La Ganga, Bank Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision: Which Lessons from Recent Market Turmoil?, 10 J. OF MONEY, INVESTMENT AND 
BANKING 79, 106, n. 50 (2009), available at http://www.eurojournals.com/jmib_10_06.pdf.  
 48 See Berndt, supra note 1, at 2. 
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V.  SKIN IN THE GAME 
A.  Description of Skin in the Game 
A general definition of skin in the game is the concept of creating a situation to 
ensure that corporations are managed by like-minded individuals who share a stake 
in the company.49  In the securitization context, skin in the game refers to a 
requirement that originators or sponsors retain a portion of the loans and securities 
they create, thus also retaining some of the risk.50  In theory, this would align the 
incentives of the banks with the goals of the investors of the SPVs because the banks 
are also invested in the final outcome.51  By forcing the bank to retain an interest in 
the loans it securitizes, the bank will be less likely to create a bad loan because any 
failures of the loans will affect the end securities issued by the SPV, and therefore 
the bank that is required to hold some of them.   
There are different ways to structure the skin in the game retention.  One way is 
for the banks to retain an interest in each individual loan that they issue.52  Howell E. 
Jackson believes that this is not an optimal method because it complicates the 
valuation exercise for investors in the loan pools.53  This would also give two entities 
an interest in each loan and would complicate the renegotiation process.54  Another 
method of requiring skin in the game is to require the banks to retain an interest in 
the securitization pool itself.55  The most likely method of doing this would be for 
the bank to hold a pro-rata share of all of the tranches issued by the SPV so that it is 
exposed to all of the levels of risk that are issued.56  This method more directly aligns 
the interests of the originators and sponsors to the interests of the investors in the 
SPV.57  For a graphical representation of a bank’s assets when there is skin in the 
game, see Appendix B. 
B.  Benefits of Skin in the Game 
In theory, skin in the game is a good way to prevent the bad loans that can 
originate from securitization.  Although it is hard prove this empirically, many 
authors have investigated the effects of having skin in the game and have found that 
it aligns incentives and interests in practice.  Economist Benjamin Keys and others 
found that the current system of broker compensation based on fees encourages 
brokers to maximize the volume of the loans they originate instead of the quality.58  
                                                          
 49 See Definition of Skin in the Game, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/s/skininthegame.asp#axzz1mJ8q1Lgj (last visited Feb. 13, 2012). 
 50 See Jackson, supra note 8, at 6. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. at 24. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See Keys, supra note 2, at 3. 
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This is compared to regulations that require brokers to have skin in the game, which 
were found to curb this moral hazard problem.59  Professors Antje Berndt and 
Anurag Gupta found that loans that are securitized underperform similar loans that 
are not securitized.60  The authors believe that this underperformance is due to the 
diminished relationship between the borrowers and the banks.61  Professor 
Amiyatosh Purnanandam came to a similar conclusion in his study which found that 
loans made in the OTD model were of inferior quality because banks that heavily 
used OTD created loans with higher default rates than banks that did not use the 
OTD model.62  Finally, Thomas Hildebrand, Manju Puri, and Jörg Rocholl found 
that online lending networks work better when the person recommending the loan 
has a stake in a fraction of the loan.63  Through these studies, the authors show how 
skin in the game regulations appear to lead to the generation of higher quality loans. 
VI.  DESCRIPTION OF THE REGULATIONS 
A.  Dodd-Frank 
The Dodd-Frank Act is binding legislation that applies to all U.S. banks.64  The 
Act is an in depth bill that attempts to restore accountability and responsibility in the 
financial sector through multiple avenues.65  The Dodd-Frank Act created a new 
independent watchdog to ensure consumers get clear and accurate information.66  
Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act created a safe way to liquidate failed financial 
firms by imposing tough new capital and leverage requirements that make it 
undesirable for a bank to get too large.67  The Dodd-Frank Act created a council to 
identify and address systemic risk posed by large, complex companies, products, and 
activities before they threaten the stability of the economy.68  The Dodd-Frank Act 
eliminated loopholes that allow risky and abusive practices to go unnoticed and 
unregulated.69  The Act provides shareholders with a say on pay and corporate affairs 
                                                          
 59 See id. at 21. 
 60 See Berndt, supra note 1, at 23. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis, 3–4 (May 11, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract-id=1167786. 
 63 See Thomas Hildebrand, Manju Puri & Jörg Rocholl, Skin in the Game: Evidence from 
the Online Lending Market, Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting 1, 25 (Oct. 
2010), http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/feaconference/docs/Session3PuriSkinintheGame.pdf. 
 64 See generally Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 5. 
 65 See Brief Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, 111TH CONG. 1 (2010), http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_ 
Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See id. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. at 2. 
2012] DODD-FRANK AND BASEL III’S SKIN IN THE GAME 167 
 
 
 
with a non-binding vote on executive compensation and golden parachutes.70  The 
Dodd-Frank Act provides tough new rules for transparency and accountability for 
credit rating agencies to protect investors and businesses.71  The Dodd-Frank Act 
also strengthens oversight and empowers regulators to aggressively pursue financial 
fraud, conflicts of interest, and manipulation of the system.72 
In addition to the aforementioned provisions, the Dodd-Frank Act has a 
requirement that the originators retain five percent of the credit risk in securitized 
assets.73  This requirement is subject to many qualifications, but will hold for many 
mortgage backed securities.  This provision is important because it requires 
originators to retain skin in the game.  Whether or not five percent is an optimal 
retention is beyond the scope of this paper, but what is important is that the Act 
requires some retention. 
B.  Basel III 
The Basel III reforms are a set of non-binding financial regulations written by the 
Basel Committee’s Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision that 
are, in practice, followed by many banks throughout the world.74  Basel III contains 
both micro-policy measures and macro-policy measures, but it is less comprehensive 
than the Dodd-Frank Act.75 
Basel III’s micro-policy measures attempt to regulate the actions of individual 
banks.  Basel III requires a substantial increase in the quality of the capital held by 
banks.76  Banks must hold appropriate capital for less liquid, credit-sensitive assets 
with much longer holding periods.  Basel III claims that securitization exposures will 
be subject to capital charges more consistent with those for the banking book.77  
Basel III requires high capital levels to absorb the types of losses associated with 
crises, similar to the one recently experienced.78  It requires a global liquidity 
standard to supplement capital regulations.79  Specifically, there will be a 
requirement for banks to be able to withstand a thirty-day system-wide liquidity 
                                                          
 70 See id.  
 71 See id. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See Dodd-Frank, supra note 5, § 941, Sec. 15G(c)(1)(B)(i). 
 74 See generally BIS Documents, supra note 6; Ezra Klein, Why You Should Care About 
Basel III, WASH. POST (July 27, 2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-
klein/2010/07/why_you_should_care_about_base.html. 
 75 See Stefan Walter, Basel III and Financial Stability, Speech at the Fifth Biennial 
Conference on Risk Management and Supervision, 2 (Nov. 3-4, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.htm). 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See id. at 3. 
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shock as well as maintain a more robust structural liquidity profile.80  Also included 
are stronger supervision, risk management, and disclosure standards.81 
Basel III’s macro-policies attempt to make economies less sensitive to risk.  
Basel III introduces a leverage ratio that will help to contain the compression of the 
risk-based requirement.82  Basel III also adds measures to raise the capital levels of 
banks in good times so that they can be drawn down in periods of stress to reduce 
procyclicality.83  It also will require global systemic banks to have additional loss 
absorbency capacity beyond the base Basel III requirements.84 
For the purposes of this paper, it is instructive to note that nowhere in Basel III is 
there a risk retention requirement.85  As a result, Basel III does not require banks to 
have any skin in the game when securitizing.86 
VII.  DIVERGENCE ON SKIN IN THE GAME REGULATION 
There are many differences between the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III 
regulations that could be compared and contrasted, but the presence, or lack, of risk 
retention is an important difference between the two.  One major problem in the 
recent financial downturn was that mortgages with an active secondary market 
systemically underperformed.87  Many actors and factors have been blamed for this.  
Rating agencies are blamed for failing to identify the risks associated with the loan 
pools.88  Mortgage brokers are blamed for abusing the system and either purposefully 
or negligently arranging loans for unqualified individuals lacking proper 
paperwork.89  The insufficiency, or complexity, of the information is also blamed for 
preventing investors and the market from independently evaluating the investments 
in asset backed securities.90 
One way that the problems associated with securitization could be avoided is to 
align the market incentives so that all parties have the same objectives and then 
allow the market to take care of the transactions.  As discussed above, some authors 
                                                          
 80 See id. 
 81 See id. 
 82 See id. 
 83 See id. at 4. 
 84 See id. 
 85 See generally Walter, supra note 75; see also BIS Documents, supra note 6. 
 86 See generally Walter, supra note 75; see also BIS Documents, supra note 6. 
 87 See Berndt, supra note 1, at 5. 
 88 See generally David J. Reiss, Ratings Failure: The Need For a Consumer Protection 
Agenda in Rating Agency Regulation (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
154, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1439748. 
 89 See Cassandra Jones Harvard, “Goin’ Round in Circles” . . . and Letting the Bad Loans 
Win: When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for Uniform Broker Regulation, 86 
UTAH L. REV. 737, 742-43 (2008). 
 90 See generally Steven Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 
2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure]. 
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have indicated that introducing skin in the game incentives will be effective in 
increasing the quality of loans and would prevent poor performance practices.  It 
also makes intuitive sense that skin in the game would work.  If an originator is 
required to bear some of the risk of the loan defaulting, the originator will have a 
greater incentive to make sure its processes will generate profitable loans instead of 
as many loans as possible. 
A.  The Dodd-Frank Act 
The Dodd-Frank Act takes into consideration the need to align market incentives 
by requiring a five percent risk retention.  This aligns the bank’s motives with that of 
the investors.  There are exceptions to the five percent retention rule,91 but it is 
unclear whether or not five percent is an optimal retention amount.  
Despite all of the benefits involved in requiring risk retention, there is a 
downside to the rule.  Just as securitization helped free bank assets and aided many 
people in receiving loans, requiring risk retention may lead to reduced lending in the 
future.  Additionally, the fees associated with securitization may compensate banks 
enough that even a complete loss of five percent of their investment would not be a 
disincentive. 
B.  Basel III 
Basel III lacks a five percent risk retention requirement.  Basel III focuses on 
capital requirements and regulating the banks, but it does not address the benefits of 
requiring skin in the game.  Non-U.S. banks issuing securities will not have the same 
motivations to issue quality securities because of their lack of skin in the game.92  
The lack of originator incentives will require the investors to conduct more costly 
investigation to assure that the securities they are purchasing are good investments.93   
Despite the harms that a lack of skin in the game can bring, there are benefits as 
well.  Without the need to have skin in the game, banks can make more loans which 
not only allow them to earn more money, but allow more people to receive loans.  
This will free up capital markets that have been chilled as a result of the recent 
financial collapse. 
VIII.  INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE 
There exists a clear divergence between Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act with 
regard to whether banks should be required to maintain risk retention.  With this 
divergence in regulatory framework, some commentators believe that it is optimal 
for regulatory frameworks to converge.94  In light of this, it is important to ask 
whether the two frameworks should converge, and if so, which regulation should be 
chosen. 
                                                          
 91 Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 5, § 941, Sec. 15G(c)(1)(B)(ii). 
 92 See Purnanandam, supra note 62, at 3-4; see also Schwarcz, Future of Securitization, 
supra note 26, at 7. 
 93 See generally Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure, supra note 90. 
 94 See Jordan Cally & Giovani Majnoni, Financial Regulatory Harmonization and the 
Globalization of Finance (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 2919, 2002), available 
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A.  Benefits of International Regulatory Convergence 
International regulatory convergence would lead to simplified communication 
and information sharing because less investigation would be necessary in order to 
invest in a jurisdiction with identical rules.95  Where there is convergence on 
securitization regulation, the transaction costs of U.S. investors are reduced.96  When 
there is not convergence, investors must hire lawyers and bankers to investigate 
business operations, disclosure documents, and the regulatory environment of the 
jurisdictions in which they intend to invest.97  Investors will find it easier to invest 
across borders and diversify their portfolios where regulations have converged.  By 
having international financial regulatory convergence, investors and borrowers 
benefit through increased and cheaper credit.  To some extent, regulatory 
convergence is a precondition for financial market integration, and as finance 
continues to flow across borders, there is a growing need for financial regulators in 
different jurisdictions to collaborate.98   
When international regulatory convergence occurs, multiple regulators from 
different backgrounds and jurisdictions can discuss and work together to develop 
best practices.99  This, theoretically, would lead to the most efficient investor 
protection regimes.100  Compliance with two or more sets of disclosure requirements 
makes it harder and more costly to comply with both when investing across 
borders.101  If jurisdictions do not work together to some extent, investors will be 
able to expose gaps and differences in systems and conduct regulatory arbitrage.102  
From the regulators’ perspective, some countries may not have the resources to 
regulate and supervise a complex financial system.103  By having international 
regulatory convergence, these smaller countries can utilize the frameworks already 
in place and adopt the sophisticated frameworks to adequately regulate and 
encourage complex financing.104 
B.  Benefits of International Regulatory Divergence 
The new regulatory frameworks show that there is a divergence relating to the 
requirement of risk retention in securitization transactions.  However, this may not 
be a bad thing.  There is uncertainty as to what is the best method to regulate 
                                                          
 95 See id. 
 96 See Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2541 (2006). 
 97 See id. 
 98 See Jordan & Majnoni, supra note 94, at 2. 
 99 See id. at 1. 
 100 See Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 327, 334 
(2010). 
 101 See id. at 334-35. 
 102 See Romano, supra note 11, at 2. 
 103 See Jordan & Manjoni, supra note 94, at 2. 
 104 See id.  
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banks.105  This problem is unlikely to ever be solved fully due to the constant change 
of financial markets and products.106  Prior to the recent financial collapse, the Basel 
Accords facilitated bank regulation harmonization.107  This resulted in nearly all 
large banks following similar strategies with regard to international securitization.108  
Banks and other financial institutions adopted bad strategies, such as the OTD 
model, because there was precedent, and until the collapse, the strategy appeared to 
be working.  Additionally, gaps in international regulation exposed more investors to 
the risks of fraud.109  When these business strategies failed, the failure was not 
restricted to investments in one state.  Rather, the failure was felt throughout the 
world and the global economy suffered.110  By having different regulatory regimes, 
there is a greater likelihood that not all of the regulators will make the same 
mistake.111  This will help reduce international systemic risk and help test different 
strategies in the pursuit to find the best practices.112 
C.  Should there be Convergence? 
When asking whether there should be international convergence in rules, it is 
important to determine to what the rules would converge.  For the purposes of this 
paper, I will focus on the concept of risk retention and simplify the examination as to 
whether regimes should require risk retention.  For the reasons noted above, 
requiring risk retention in securitization appears to be a better policy than not 
requiring risk retention.  A large body of literature has been written describing how 
requiring originators to bear a proportion of the risk of the assets they create is 
beneficial.113  However, there is no way to be sure that the upside to aligning banks’ 
interests with that of investors outweighs the disadvantages.  With all the benefits of 
requiring risk retention, there are also benefits to not requiring risk retention.114  
There is also little to no literature showing that five percent is an optimal retention 
amount.  The lack of risk retention allows more access to credit for investors in a 
tough market.  Banks would also be able to make more profits in a time where they 
are hurting.  The divergence in possible best practices makes it more favorable that 
the two systems do not converge, at least initially, until one of the regulations is 
shown to work better in practice. 
                                                          
 105 See Romano, supra note 11, at 19. 
 106 See id. 
 107 See id. at 16. 
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There are benefits to not having international convergence on financial regulation 
in general as discussed above.  Because of the benefits, Basel III’s position to not 
require risk retention may benefit the overall financial industry.  By allowing 
different regulatory regimes, local jurisdictions can tailor rules to best meet their 
needs and desires.115  By having multiple systems and rules, different regimes can be 
tested in practice.  Best practices can then be discovered and utilized by jurisdictions 
as they are proven.  In the present case, if the risk retention leads to better asset-
backed securities being issued, and this creates a better banking system than in 
countries that lack the risk retention, the Dodd-Frank Act will be vindicated, and 
other countries will likely adopt the regulation.  If countries that do not have a risk 
retention requirement generate high-quality asset-backed securities, and lead to a 
more fluid and profitable financial system, then Basel III will be vindicated and the 
U.S. can remove the risk retention requirement.  
Even though risk retention appears to be the better policy, it has yet to be tested, 
and as such, uncertainty exists whether it is a preferable policy in practice.  Further, 
there are benefits to not having international convergence that will help avoid 
another international financial collapse.  In light of these two considerations, the 
different policies between the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III with regard to risk 
retention appears to be a beneficial divergence.   
IX.  CONCLUSION 
The OTD model of banking led to significant securitization and the creation of 
many poorly performing loans.  The poor performance of these loans was a major 
cause of the recent financial collapse.  In response, both the Dodd-Frank Act and 
Basel III were passed to better regulate banks.  Notably, the Dodd-Frank Act 
contained a provision that required banks to maintain five percent risk retention in 
securitizations whereas Basel III has no such risk retention requirement.  Although 
both regulations require banks to maintain higher capital levels, without requiring 
the banks to hold skin in the game, the raised capital levels will do little to prevent 
banks from securitizing their loans.  Banks are able to circumvent the system 
because churning loans allows banks to sell their receivables in exchange for capital, 
thereby meeting their capital requirements.  As a result, the Dodd-Frank Act does a 
better job of addressing the problems inherent in the OTD model of banking.   
There are still drawbacks to the Dodd-Frank Act’s risk retention requirement.  
Securitization was a useful financial tool that allowed banks to be more profitable, 
allowed borrowers better access to loans, and allowed non-institutional investors to 
invest in the mortgage market.  By requiring risk retention, the Dodd Frank Act will 
inhibit the securitization market.  Banks will likely be unable to churn loans as much 
as they would without the risk retention.  Since the financial market is still reeling 
from the recent collapse, this could further inhibit an economic rebound.  A 
divergence in regulatory regimes can prevent a systemic downturn.  Additionally, 
having the two regimes test the two different regulations will prove, in practice, 
which is actually the better policy.  As one regulation proves itself, the other 
regulatory framework can adopt it.  The lack of convergence between Basel III and 
the Dodd Frank Act with regard to risk retention can be beneficial for international 
banking. 
                                                          
 115 See Romano, supra note 11, at 15. 
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